The trend toward deregulation and the relatively high prices in the Florida milk market have increased competition for milk supplies between the Florida dairy cooperatives (FDCs) and other cooperatives like Dairymen Incorporated and Southern Milk Sales. Because of the increased competition in the Florida markets, the FDCs may need to implement a discriminatory spatial pricing policy. The discriminatory pricing policy allows the FDCs to expand their membership by absorbing some of the transportation cost of producers in distant locations that would otherwise be independent producers or members of competing cooperatives. Spatial pricing policies are analyzed to determine the effects of discriminatory pricing on the blend price, average aggregate revenue of cooperative members, and total costs and quantity of milk imports. The results of this study show that a nondiscriminatory pricing policy maximizes the cooperative members' blend price and average aggregate revenue. However, if the FDCs were able to increase the price by $0.50 as a result of using spatial price discrimination to gain market power, spatial price discrimination would maximize average revenue and blend price.
The federal government has been involved in the ciation (TIDFA) are two groups of producers that dairy industry since 1933. Before government in-are currently facing these issues. tervention, the industry was dominated by milk
The Florida milk market is a high-valued market handlers that behaved as monopsonists (Manches-dominated by fluid milk sales. In 1992, the ter 1983). The Agricultural Marketing Agreement weighted average Class I (fluid milk products) utiAct of 1937 provided enabling legislation to farm-lization rate for the three federal milk marketing ers for establishing federal milk marketing orders. orders in Florida was 85.7% (Federal Milk Mar- The government encouraged such orders to estab-keting Order 1992). The weighted average blend lish orderly marketing conditions that approxi-price for the three federal milk marketing orders in mated a competitive market (AAEA 1986) . Mas-Florida in 1992 was $15.35 per hundredweight, son and Eisenstat (1980) indicate that the move-compared with $13.57 (North Atlantic), $12.68 ment toward deregulation of the dairy industry (East North Central), and $13.13 (all markets) arises from concerns that the federal orders and (Federal Milk Marketing Order 1992) . The comprice support program have resulted in a marketing bined sales from four cooperatives-FDFA, environment that relies little on price discovery TIDFA, Southern Milk Sales, and Dairymen Incormechanisms and too much on classified pricing porated-account for virtually all of the milk sold and the monopoly power of producer cooperatives. to twenty Florida processing facilities. Of these As the dairy industry becomes less regulated, a four cooperatives, FDFA and TIDFA represent apprimary concern of producers is the impact on proximately 91.5% of the total fluid milk sales to farm-level income of increasing competition for processors in the Florida dairy market; FDFA has supply contracts in the local markets. The members 75% of these sales and TIDFA the remaining 25% of the Florida Dairy Farmers Association (FDFA) (FDFA 1992; TIDFA 1992) . In addition to the coand the Tampa Independent Dairy Farmers Asso-operatives' large share of the Florida market, TIDFA and FDFA have also coordinated milk shipments in the recent past. For these reasons, when consumption patterns are steadily increasing Marketing Environment (Kilmer et al. 1992) , dairy producers are unable to produce an adequate supply of milk because of the adverse effects of environmental conditions. Dur-Federal Market Orders and Price ing these months, the Florida dairy cooperatives Support Programs must obtain supplemental milk from import sources to fulfill supply contracts. For example, in .. i ic 1992 theimporte o pous of The tools of U.S. dairy policy are the federal mar-1992 the FDCs imported 120,183,725 pounds of 1992 the FDCs imported 120,183,725 pounds of keting orders and the price support program. The milk from sources as distant as fifteen hundred ketg orders e c spp program The marketing orders use a classified pricing system to miles from the Florida market (FDFA 1992;  Tmies from the Florida markeit , (FDFA 1992; •ensure an adequate supply of fluid milk to the retail TIDFA 1992). Within the deficit months, approxi-market. Meanwhile, the price support program market. Meanwhile, the price support program mately 30% of the total milk imports occur in Sep-mata price foor for ra m or maintains a price floor for Grade B milk, or milk tember. Because of the transportation cost associ-processe ito mafactri procts I processed into manufacturing products. In 1960, ated with shipping raw milk, FDCs have paid as eighty federal marketing orders regulated 43% of much T^ as^ ' $22.87 peighty federal marketing orders regulated 43% of much as $22.87 per hundredweight for supplemen-all milk marketed. By the end of 1993, approxitamilk ( e e al. ' 19) ^PP -all milk marketed. By the end of 1993, approxital milk (Kilmer et al. 1992) .
mately 70% of total milk marketings within the The trend toward deregulation, the increasing The trend toward deregulation, the increasing United States was regulated by thirty-eight federal Florida population (which increases the demand for dairy products), and the relatively high prices in ses marketing order are composed of Class I, the Florida market have increased competition for the Florida, ma~rket have increased competition for Class II, and Class III sales. Class I sales are repmilk supplies (i.e., milk producers). Because of the milk supplies (i.e., milk prod ). B e of te resented by the percentage of total production used increased competition, the FDCs need to keep increased competition, the FDCs need to keep for beverage purposes. Soft products, such as ice prices low to fluid milk processors, keep returns ces low to fluid mik processors, keep eturns cream and yogurt, represent Class II sales. Class III high to dairy farmers, and bring producers into the high to dairy farmers, and b.ng producers .to the .milk is manufactured into cheese, butter, and nonFDCs in order to satisfy the increasing demand in ft dy m -). T p a fat dry milk (III-A). These products are better the Florida milk market. This article focuses on ko as storae milk p uct. or areti known as storable milk products. For marketing expanding the cooperative membership to meet the orders east of the Rocky Mountains class pces orders east of the Rocky Mountains, class prices increasing demand for dairy products in Florida; i i -however, in g the m hip ao are based on the pnrice paid by unregulated proceshowever, increasing the FDCs' membership also sors for manufacturin ade milk in the Minneaffects the prices charged processors and the re-sota-Wisconsin (MW) rei Thi ein sota-Wisconsin (M-W) region. This region repturns to dairy farmers.
turns to da~iry farmers, resents a marketing area where local production To expand the number of producers in the FDCs, c t . exceeds consumption throughout the year. Subsethe FDCs must go beyond Florida borders, because, n a quently, Minnesota-Wisconsin producers are a the FDCs already have approximately 97% of the quently, M ne ota-Wis ducers are supplemental source of raw milk during deficit production in Florida (Cooperative Records). By monts n oter maretn ar months in other marketing areas. implementing a discriminatory spatial pricing implementing a discr atory spatial pricing In all marketing orders, the class price is related policy, the FDCs may be able to expand the num-to the M-W ce. Fo ber of cooperative members by absorbing some of marketing order's Class III price is generally the the transportation cost of producers in distant lo-M-W price. The Class price is the M-W price cations that would otherwise be independent procations that would otherwise be independent pro-plus a price differential that usually totals $0.25 per ducers or members of competing cooperatives. ducers or members of competing cooperatives, hundredweight (Schiek 1991). The Class I price is With a discriminatory spatial pricing policy, the the M-W price plus a Class I differential that is FDCs may be able to decrease the quantity and established in the federal orders. The differences in total cost of milk imports by expanding their milk total cost of milk imports by expanding their milk price differentials reflect the additional costs (i.e., supplies, to increase the total income of producer tn ad s y r) transportation and sanitary requirements) associmembers, and to be competitive with other pro-t ai Aq i inr members, and to be competitive with other po-ated with marketing Grade A fluid milk. In 1994, ducer cooperatives. In this article, spatial pricing th Class I dfferentials f E Claire, Wisconpolicies are analyzed to determine the effects of sin (the geographic center of the Minnesotasin (the geographic center of the Minnesotadiscriminatory pricing on the blend price, average W s r , t C Wisconsin supply region), to Chicago and Miami aggregate revenue of cooperative members, and were $1.40 and $4.18, respectively (Federal Milk total costs and quantity of milk imports. This ar-Marketing Order 1994). tide will determine which spatial pricing policy, discriminatory or nondiscriminatory, provides more benefits in terms of the levels of blend price and average aggregate revenue to the FDCs' memAs of May 1995, the M-W price is known as the Basic Formula Price bers. (BFP).
Market Power dependent of the concentration of dairy cooperatives (Babb 1989; Christ 1980 ; Jesse and Johnson Since Congress passed the Capper-Volstead Act of 1985). Babb (1989) estimated over-order payments 1922, dairy farmers have been collectively bar-as a function of cooperative concentration, presgaining with milk handlers through cooperative or-ence of a major cooperative in a market, price reganizations. Over the years, the membership in lationships among orders, utilization rates, cost of these cooperatives has increased to the point where milk services, product concentration, and proces-82% of all producer milk is marketed through dairy sor concentration. Babb used cross-sectional data cooperatives (Jacobson and Cropp 1994). The pri-for each year during the period 1970-87. The remary role of dairy cooperatives is to perform mar-suits of Babb's article showed that the estimated keting services for member producers. These mar-coefficients for cooperative concentration and the keting services include milk assembly, testing, ad-presence of a major cooperative were generally not vertising, record keeping, market analysis, and, statistically different from zero. The impacts of most important, obtaining supply contracts with both processor and cooperative concentration on individual processors.
the level of over-order payments were found to be As the supply of milk marketed by local coop-relatively small. Variables that did have significant eratives increased, milk handlers let dairy coopera-impacts on over-order payments were the price retives do their short-term and seasonal balancing of lationships among orders and the cost of raw milk supply with demand (Gaunmitz 1963) . Some of the services. The article revealed that over-order payservices provided to the milk handlers are disposal ments had a positive relationship with the cost of of milk in excess of fluid requirements, arranging milk services and the cost of milk from alternative for an adequate supply of fluid milk on a supple-sources. Although these results do not indicate that mental or continuing basis, and providing stan-cooperative concentration does not have an impact dardized milk by performing quality control func-on over-order payments, the results do support the tions (Babb 1989) . For these services, milk han-theory that variables related to federal regulations dlers pay cooperatives over-order payments. Some impact these payments more than do structural have suggested that these over-order payments are variables. an indication of cooperatives' increasing market power resulting in part from the federal milk mar-Spatial Pricing keting orders (Masson and Eisenstat 1980) .
Although there are no regulations that directly As competition increases in local markets, coopbenefit cooperatives, critiques of the federal milk eratives may secure a larger milk supply by using marketing order system suggest that the regula-some form of spatial price discrimination. Under tions indirectly lead to market power by preventing the existing federal milk marketing orders, transcompetition in local markets (Kessel 1967) . For portation differentials help assure an adequate supexample, pooling provisions provide larger dairy ply of fluid grade milk in local markets. These cooperatives with the opportunity to increase mar-transportation differentials are known as location ket share in areas that are more competitive. Dom-or zone differentials. Within a milk marketing orinant cooperatives that operate in several markets der, the location differential is a function of how can use the pooling provisions to increase the far a producer is removed from the metropolitan blend price and eliminate competition from other area or base point. The differential increases with dairy cooperatives (Masson and Eisenstat 1980) . distance and reduces the blend price that is paid to As competition is reduced, the dominant coopera-producers. The original purpose of the location diftive becomes the major source of raw milk for ferential was to establish a supply region for a regulated handlers in the local market. This situa-market and to allow processors within the market tion provides the cooperatives with an opportunity to purchase milk at the same price, net of transto negotiate over-order payments in excess of what portation costs. The differentials establish a boundwould prevail in a competitive market.
ary around a marketing area so that there are no Masson and Eisenstat (1980) argue that once a price incentives for producers or processors lodairy cooperative is the dominant supplier of milk cated in other regions to compete in the local marin a region, monopoly premiums can be obtained ket (AAEA 1986) . As the markets become more from milk handlers because they lack a stable sup-competitive, producer organizations are expanding ply of raw milk from other sources. An alternative markets by creating price incentives with spatial theory is that the federal milk marketing orders and pricing policies. the price relationships among orders create an en-
The spatial pricing policies can be nondiscrimivironment where the monopoly premiums are in-natory or discriminatory. The pricing scheme is nondiscriminatory when the farm price is equal to (1) Gross Pool = TR =f{Qmi, Pmi, OOPmp}, the market price minus transportation cost between where TR = total revenue the farm and the market. Spatial price discrimination exists when the farm price is not equal to the operative to milk handlers in month market price minus transportation cost between the m measured in hundredweights (m = farm and the market.
farm and the market. 1,... ,12, and i = 1,... ,3); A nondiscriminatory pricing policy known as = p o Ca i milk in m h m; free on board (F.O.B.) pricing could be implemipce of Class i m in month m; mented by the cooperatives. An F.O.B. pricing p nt y processing plant p (p = 1,..., 10). policy allows each producer to receive the same blend price from the cooperative; however, proMultiplying the quantity and price variables ducers pay the full farm-to-market transportation generates the revenue associated with each class of cost. The farm price for all producers is equal to milk. In addition to the revenue generated from the blend price that is paid by the cooperative less class sales, the monthly over-order payment also the full farm-to-market transportation cost.
contributes to the pool. The monthly revenue gen-A discriminatory pricing scheme is freight ab-erated from over-order payments is arrived at by sorption. A cooperative using a freight-absorbing multiplying the Class I and II sales of Florida propricing scheme will subsidize the distant producers cessors by the amount of the over-order payment. by absorbing some element of transportation cost. The mathematical equation that determines the Discrimination from this pricing policy comes revenue in the gross pool is from the fact that nearby producers pay more than the full cost of transportation while distant produc- (2) Gross Pool = ers receive some type of transportation subsidy. To 12 3 10 2 fund the transportation credits to distant producers, PmQmi + 00PmpQmi the cooperative can pay nearby producers a lower m=L i=i p=i i=1 blend price or use money generated from the memBefore a blend price can be calculated, the gross bers' revenue pool. Because all cooperative mem-pool is adjusted by deducting the cost of fluid milk bers contribute to the pool, the transportation dis-imports and the transportation cost associated with counts are being partially funded by nearby pro-disposing of surplus milk (exports) produced by ducers.
the FDCs' members. Because these costs are allocated equally to all cooperative members, the gross Empirical Model of the Florida Dairy Industry pool is reduced accordingly. The generalized functional form of the annual costs associated with imIn this section, an empirical model of milk proorts is curement in Florida is developed. Specifically, conceptual relationships dealing with producers'
CMP=f{Q P D HR revenue, milk imports, milk exports, and spatial op op pricing are explored. To determine the average ag-where CMP = total cost of imports; gregate revenue of Florida dairy producers, a sysQmop = quantity of milk imported in month tem of equations shows the step-by-step derivam from origin o to processing plant tions of cooperative members' milk payments. p in hundredweights (o = 1, This set of equations is an accurate representation .. ., 17); of how the FDCs determine the monthly payments Pmo = price per hundredweight of milk imto member producers. ported in month m from origin o; The procedures for deriving the average aggreDop = distance from origin o to processgate revenue of Florida dairy producers for each ing plant p; month start with the dairy cooperatives. The first HR = hauling rate per mile, per hundredtask is to identify what variables are used to calweight of milk; culate the cooperatives' total revenue. The FDCs and the annual cost associated with exports is operate in a system that pools the revenue generated from its members' total production. The gross 4 C =f , D HR\ pool is the combined revenue from the sale of comah ah operative members' production before any deduc-where CXP = total transportation cost of exports; tions for the cost of imports and exports. With the Qmah = quantity of cooperative member three classes of milk in federal milk marketing ormilk exported in month m from proders, the FDCs' gross pool is represented as duction area a to hard manufactur-ing plant h in hundredweights (a = Because the objective of the model in this article 1, ... , 40 and h = 1, ... , 19); is to maximize the average aggregate revenue of Dah = distance from production area a to the FDCs' members, the next step is to calculate a hard manufacturing plant h; production area's gross revenue from milk sales. HR = hauling rate per mile, per hundred-Gross revenue from milk sales is found by multiweight of milk. plying a producer's total production by the net blend price (equation [9] ): To develop the mathematical equations, the generalized forms represented in equations (3) and (4) 12 are expanded such that the annual costs of imports (9) Gross farm-to-market shipments of milk. Because of this assumption, each FDC subtracts from the producThe annual net pool, or gross pool adjusted for assump , ech sutrcts ro the r the costs of imports and exports, is calculated by g urredby the subtracting equations (5) and (6) where SBm = the transportation cost (subsidy) ZONa = transportation charge per hundredabove $1.284 per hundredweight of milk not weight of milk from production charged to individual milk producers who have a area a to processor p; transportation cost from farm to processor in exQmap = quantity of cooperative member cess of $1.284. The $1.284 is a value determined milk in month m shipped from proby the cooperatives. If a producer has transportaduction area a to processing plant p tion costs higher than $1.284 per hundredweight, in hundredweights; the producer receives a subsidy for the difference. PUma = total pickup charge at production The value of the subsidy is determined with the area a in month m; model. BASma = total base charge at production area When computing a per hundredweight net blend a in month m; price, the revenue in the net pool is divided by the DISma = total volume discount at production sum of all cooperative members' monthly producarea a in month m. tion. On an annual basis, the net blend price is A production area's milk check is the total value of monthly production net of transportation cost. 12 e^ 40^ The objective of this model is to maximize the (8) Net Blend Price = Net Pool/3 ,Qma, aggregate value of cooperative members' milk m=l a=l checks for the 1992 calendar year. By subtracting where Qma = quantity of member milk production equation (10) from equation (9), the annual reavailable at production area a in ceipts (i.e., milk check) for a production area are month m in hundredweights. obtained (equation [11] ). plant h in month m in hundredThe objective function of the model is develweights; oped by replacing the NBPm in equation (11) with Sm = available supply from origin o in equation (8) and summing equation (11) over the month m in hundredweights. forty production areas. The final adjustment is re-
The decision variables in the model are Qma, placing Qmi in equation (7) where URmp = Class I utilization rate in month m pensive import source during deficit months, and •eeat processor p. rt imo (3) disposing of milk in the surplus months. The model is equally concerned with activities (e.g., the The objective function and the constraints cost of supplemental milk and the net revenue from needed to complete the model are illustrated below export sales) that affect the value of the blend price in equations (12) (17), is a nonnegativity subsidy, the market boundary of the FDCs is comconstraint for the value of the unknown decision pressed to reflect the assumed market boundary variables.
before the policy of spatial price discrimination. Without a transportation subsidy, the authors assume that the seven production areas identified in Alternative Spatial Pricing Scenarios the FAPM would no longer be members of the FDCs. Hence, the FDCs represent forty production According to industry representatives of the FDCs, areas in the FAPM and thirty-three production arthe objective of the organizations is to keep returns eas in the FOBPM. By removing the hauling rate high to dairy farmers. To accomplish this objec-cap and shrinking the market boundary, the effects tive, the FDCs may need to expand the market of freight absorption can be compared with results boundary by using spatial price discrimination in from an F.O.B. pricing policy that approximates the form of freight absorption. With this article, the marketing conditions before spatial price discrimieffects of spatial price discrimination on the blend nation. price, the average aggregate revenue of members, and the total costs and quantity of milk imports and exports are analyzed. The model developed in the Data Requirements previous section is used to compare the results of two pricing scenarios: freight absorption and non-Most of the data needed to conduct the study were discriminatory spatial pricing in the form of F.O.B. collected from the Florida Dairy Farmers Associapricing. The differences in the empirical models tion, Tampa Independent Dairy Farmers, Southern for the two scenarios are discussed below.
Milk Sales, and Dairymen Incorporated. The comIn the freight absorption pricing model (FAPM), bined sales from these organizations account for the FDCs expand their market boundary by pro-virtually all of the milk that is sold to processors viding a transportation subsidy to distant producers within the Florida milk market. The input for the located on the market boundary. The transportation model requires monthly data collected over a onesubsidy is implemented through a farm-to-market year time span. Because the 1992 calendar year hauling rate cap. The hauling rate cap places an provided the most recent data, this year was chosen upper bound on how much the FDCs will charge as the time period for the study. The specific data members for farm-to-market transportation cost. requirements are associated with production, proThe current hauling rate cap is set by the FDCs at cessors, manufacturing plants, import sources, and $1.284 per hundredweight. To determine if a pro-transportation cost. duction area qualifies for a subsidy, the transportation cost calculated in equation (10) is divided by Production Areas and Supply a production area's total monthly production. If the per hundredweight farm-to-market transportation To establish a production area for the model, procost is greater than $1.284, the production area duction data on a per farm basis was collected from receives a subsidy for the difference. After the eli-the FDCs. The only guideline for establishing a gible production areas are identified, the model production area is that each area contains three or determines the total cost of the freight absorption more producers. Production areas usually correpricing policy by summing the values of each sub-spond with a single county. In situations where sidy. The total cost of the freight absorption policy several counties are combined to form a single prois then subtracted from the FDCs' net pool (equa-duction area, the county with the largest annual tion [7] ) before a blend price is calculated.
production will contain the geographical center of The FAPM identified seven production areas that production area. The combined production of that received transportation subsidies throughout FDFA and TIDFA members results in forty pro-1992. With the exception of Clay County, Florida, duction areas. all production areas receiving a transportation subsidy were located in the Florida panhandle or south Marketing Areas and Demand Georgia. The authors assume that these seven production areas are members of the FDCs because of Specific locations in Florida are designated as marthe freight absorption pricing policy.
keting areas, which represent one or more proces- sors. The Florida market contains ten marketing Export Alternatives areas. The monthly demand for raw milk at each marketing area varies across months, but the total The total number of export alternatives in the demand for each processor is fixed to correspond model is nineteen. These nineteen locations reprewith the actual quantity of milk processed during sent viable export alternatives for the Florida co-1992. The demand at all marketing areas is satis-operatives. All plants received at least 100,000 fied by milk shipments from cooperative members pounds of milk in 1992. Any location that received and imported milk that is marketed through the less than 100,000 pounds is not considered a viable cooperatives, export alternative. Monthly processing capacity for The prices that are paid by marketing areas cor-manufacturing plants, which are the types of plants respond to the class prices of Federal Milk Mar-that received most of the FDCs' exported milk, are keting Orders 6, 12, and 13. Table 1 lists the 1992 fixed at levels that coincide with the total amount prices that were paid in each of these federal milk of exports shipped to that plant by FDCs during marketing orders. The Class I price that a market-1992. ing area pays is dependent on the location of the The prices at export plants are based on the marketing area. The Class II prices for producers in monthly M-W price that is illustrated in table 1. To the Florida market are the same across marketing arrive at the model's monthly Class III price, the orders. Also included in table 1 are the M-W (Class M-W is adjusted according to the guidelines in the III) prices for 1992.
contract between Florida cooperatives and DairyMarketing areas also pay an over-order payment men Incorporated.
2 For reasons of confidentiality, on all Class I and II milk that is processed at that the contract specifications are not outlined in the particular location. The value of the over-order article. payment is an exogenous variable that differs across marketing areas and months. For each mar-Import Sources keting area, the monthly average over-order payment is based on the actual payments made by ment is based on the actual payments made by The model includes seventeen import sources loindividual processors in 1992. Because of confi-ced thouhou he nte Se.
Ech import cated throughout the United States. Each import dential data, the over-order payment is an average . met source represents a location in which supplemental payment per hundredweight of Class I and II milk milk was obtained by Florida cooperatives in 1992.
milk was obtained by Florida cooperatives in 1992. from processors located in a particular marketing from processors located in a particular m ng The quantity of milk available at each import e final exe s variabe a iated wih source is determined by using the same procedures The final exogenous variable associated with outlined above when assigning processing capaciprocessors is the utilization rate. A processor's uti-ties at export facilities. The price that the cooperalization rate determines the quantity of milk that es st p fr he ppeental mk i detertives must pay for the supplemental milk is deterwill be processed into Class I and II products. The actual utilization rates for each processor are used to determine a marketing area's weighted average
The contract price applies to milk that is shipped to plants that are Class I and II utilization rates. The utilization rates owned by Dairyman Inc. or shipments to plants in which Dairyman Inc. vary by marketing area and month.
acts as the broker for Florida cooperatives.
mined by using the actual prices reported by the volume discount. With the FDFA's current pricing FDCs. policy, a production area's per-hundredweight transportation cost cannot exceed the cooperatives' Transportation Cost predetermined hauling rate cap of $1.284. If the farm-to-market transportation cost is greater than e final da r ent p inf n on $1.284 per hundredweight, the production area reThe final data requirement provides information on ceives a subsidy to pay the additional transportatransportation cost. The two types of transportation ceves a subsidy to pay the additional transprta tion costs above the cap of $1.284 per hundredcost in the model are farm-to-market transportation on c s bove the cp of $.4 per hnde weight. This subsidy is given to compensate the cost and transportation cost associated with imign o o an cooperative members living in north Florida and ports and exports. To calculate any transportation ooeratie e er north Florida and south Georgia when their milk is hauled to buyers cost, the following distance variables are needed: north and w est of Florida be ause FDFA has â ,i ^ , .\ * north and west of Florida because FDFA has a (1) production area to marketing area, (2) producof e a surplus of milk. TIDFA does not have a transportion area to export alternatives, and (3) import source to processing plant. The origin and destination points of these distance variables are determined by using the geographical center of the production areas and the exact location of the Results processors, manufacturers, and import sources. AUTOMAP is used to determine the exact distance The results of the FAPM and FOBPM are prefor all production areas, marketing areas, export sented in table 2. In this table, the annual results for alternatives, and import sources.
1992 are compared for each pricing policy. DifferAlong with the mileage, the additional informa-ences in the average aggregate revenue, blend tion needed to calculate the transportation cost on price, production, cost of imports and exports, and imports and exports is a hauling rate. The hauling quantity of imports and exports are used to explain rate on imports and exports is $2.00 per loaded the results of the nondiscriminatory and discrimimile with a load of milk equal to 475 hundred-natory pricing scenarios. weights (FDFA 1992; TIDFA 1992) . Dividing the The first variable in table 2 is the average ag-$2.00 per loaded mile by 475 gives a figure of gregate revenue, or mailbox price. The objective .0042105, which represents the per mile, per hun-function of the model (equation [12] ) maximizes dredweight hauling charge for imports and exports. the average aggregate revenue of all the members This value remains constant across months.
in the FDCs. The aggregate revenue in the model is The hauling rate schedule used to calculate equivalent to the sum of FDCs' payments to profarm-to-market transportation cost is a modified ducers in 1992. Dividing the aggregate revenue by version of FDFA's hauling rate schedule. Many the total milk supply yields the average aggregate aspects of FDFA's hauling schedule are used to revenue, or mailbox price, for members of the calculate the production-area-to-market transporta-FDCs. The FAPM and the FOBPM result in mailtion cost. The levels of the base, zone, and pick-up box prices of $15.50 and $15.76, respectively. The charges are obtained directly from the hauling rate nondiscriminatory pricing model has an annual schedule provided by FDFA. The production-area-mailbox price that is $0.26 higher than the average to-market transportation cost for a production area mailbox price paid to producers after expanding is calculated by adding together the total base, the market boundary. zone, and pick-up charges and subtracting the total The ranking of the net blend price from each scenario is also consistent with the results of the ferences in the two models. In the FAPM, the FDCs represent a larger milk supply. Because of the larger supply of local production, the cooperatives import terns are consistent with the results of the FOBPM. less milk during the deficit months. In contrast, the The average aggregate revenue, net blend price, market boundary is compressed in the FOBPM, and and total production are compiled for the surplus the FDCs represent only thirty-three production ar-and deficit months and reported in table 3 for both eas. The decrease in local production results in a the FAPM and the FOBPM. larger quantity of milk imports. With table 3, the results of the FAPM and the As expected, the FAPM reduces the cost and FOBPM can be compared on the basis of surplus quantity of imports at the expense of exported and deficit months. In the surplus months, the milk. The FOBPM exports 223,960.06 hundred-FAPM results in a mailbox price of $15.20 and a weights of milk at a total cost of $308,133.64. The net blend price of $15.88 per hundredweight. Reaverage transportation cost of exports in the suits from the same months in the FOBPM show FOBPM is $1.38 per hundredweight. Because of that both the mailbox price and the net blend price the larger supply of local production, the FAPM are higher, $15.74 and $ 16.42, respectively. In the increases the total cost and quantity of exported surplus months, the nondiscriminatory spatial pricmilk. The FAPM exports 1,253,195.23 hundred-ing policy increases both the mailbox price and the weights of milk at a cost of $2,262,306.48, which net blend price by $0.54 per hundredweight. As results in an average transportation cost of exports expected, the results are opposite in the deficit of $1.81 per hundredweight. Notice that the opti-months. By increasing the local supply of milk, mum pricing strategy, F.O.B. pricing, results in the which reduces milk imports in the deficit months, lower cost of exports and the higher cost of im-the FAPM increases both the mailbox price ports. In contrast, a policy of spatial price discrimi-($16.00) and the net blend price ($16.80). The nation results in the higher cost of exports and the FOBPM results in a mailbox price of $15.81 and a lower cost of imports. Based on these results, the net blend price of $16.57. These prices are $0.19 outcome of the study appears to be dependent on and $0.23, respectively, less than the correspondwhich pricing strategy results in the lower cost of ing prices in the FAPM. The results of the deficit exported milk. These results are consistent with months indicate that a policy of spatial price diswhat Nubern and Kilmer (1995) found in a study crimination maximizes the average aggregate revof alternative procurement systems for Florida enue of members if the FDCs are importing milk. dairy farmers.
The study indicates that the optimum pricing Given the apparent relationship between the op-strategy is F.O.B. pricing. F.O.B. pricing maxitimum pricing strategy and the transportation cost mizes the average aggregate revenue and results in of exports, table 3 illustrates the changes in aver-the lower cost of exports. The FDCs export milk age aggregate revenue and net blend price for sur-seven months out of twelve. Because of the loss in plus and deficit months. Traditionally, the surplus revenue associated with disposing of surplus milk, months in the Florida market are December a freight absorption pricing strategy that expands through June and the deficit months are July the market boundary is not the optimum pricing through November. These import and export pat-policy for the FDCs. Currently, the benefits asso-ciated with freight absorption are not enough to aggregate revenue per cooperative member are offset the additional cost of exporting milk. If the less than what would occur if all production marketing environment changes and the FDCs in-areas were paying the full farm-to-market transporcrease the total quantity of milk shipped into tation cost (i.e., F.O.B. pricing model); however, Florida, the results indicate that a policy of freight a policy of spatial price discrimination is optimum absorption would be effective in this situation.
in the deficit months. By expanding the market boundary and representing a larger supply of local production, the FDCs are able to reduce Sensitivity Analysis the cost and quantity of imported milk. The disadvantage to this pricing policy is that the cost In both spatial pricing models, the prices paid by and quantity of exports are increased. For these milk handlers are fixed. If prices remain un-reasons, the FAPM is the optimum policy in changed as the FDCs expand the market boundary, the deficit months and the FOBPM is the optithe study shows that the FOBPM maximizes the mum policy in the surplus months. Because the average aggregate revenue per hundredweight. The FOBPM maximizes the annual average aggregate problem with this solution is that the current revenue per member, the results appear to be FAPM does not account for changes in price that dependent on which pricing policy reduces may result from an increase in bargaining power. the costs of exported milk. If the market environIn the FAPM, the FDCs may increase their market ment changes so that the FDCs are importing milk power by expanding the market boundary. By con-most of the year, a policy of spatial price discrimitrolling a larger supply of local milk production, nation could maximize the members' mailbox the FDCs may bargain for higher prices if they are price. successful in protecting the Florida market from A nondiscriminatory pricing policy maximizes alternative milk supplies.
the cooperative members' annual blend price Assume that in the FAPM the FDCs have suf-and annual average aggregate revenue. However, ficient market power so that they can bargain for if the FDCs were able to increase the proceshigher prices. Since the FAPM already maximizes sor price by at least $0.50 using spatial price the average aggregate revenue in the deficit discrimination to gain market power, spatial months, an assumption is made that the FDCs price discrimination would maximize average would bargain for higher prices only in the surplus aggregate revenue and blend price. There may be months (December through June). Through sensi-other economic variables (i.e., interregional price tivity analysis, scenarios that have price increases relationships, competition between the two Florida in the surplus months are created. Price increases cooperatives, alternative supplies from other coopare incorporated into the model through the over-eratives) that would determine whether the FDCs order payment.
could bargain for a higher processor price. Further To determine at what point the FAPM becomes research could employ game theory to determine the optimal solution, the over-order payment is re-the impact on the results from the competition beduced parametrically from an initial value of tween the two Florida cooperatives. This article $1.00. Through gradual reductions in price, the assumes that the current competitive environment model showed that a $0.50 increase in the over-would continue. Furthermore, contestable market order payment is necessary for the FAPM to be-theory could be employed to determine the impact come the optimal solution. With a $0.50 increase on the results from the cooperatives outside Florida in an over-order premium, the FAPM has mailbox that would like to supply milk to Florida. An analyand net blend prices of $15.77 and $16.49, respec-sis of how these issues affect the cooperatives' tively. These results are $0.01 higher than those of spatial pricing strategy is beyond the scope of this the FOBPM ( 
